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1

There are more ways than one to skin a cat. – English proverb
I.

INTRODUCTION

Statutes that time-bar actions relating to “improvements to real
property” have long been construed in teasingly diverse and
2
deceptively complex ways. A permutation of mid-twentieth century
tort reform, these statutes emerged as privity requirements eroded,
3
and left in their wake interpretive confusion. For the last half
century, courts have struggled to define what qualifies as an
improvement to real property, an exercise that pits the economic
interests of industry against the personal interests of tort and other
4
litigants. Relying on language, policy, pragmatism, and legislative
5
intent, state courts are still striving to establish a comfortable
understanding of this term and its application under statutes
limiting related claims.
Minnesota recently addressed a new facet of this issue. In Lietz
6
v. Northern States Power Co., the supreme court considered whether
installation of an improvement to real property must be complete to
subject it to Minnesota’s applicable statute of limitations under
7
section 541.051. Tackling the temporal aspect of real property
improvements, the court held that an installation need not be

1. THE NEW DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY (E.D. Hirsch et al. eds.,
Houghton Mifflin Co. 3d ed. 2002).
2. See Keith J. Halleland & Thomas F. Nelson, The Statute of Limitations in
Construction-Related Cases: The Return to Common Law and Common Sense, 57
HENNEPIN LAW. 8, 8–9 (1988). See generally William D. Bremer, Annotation, What
Constitutes “Improvement to Real Property” for Purposes of Statute of Repose or Statute of
Limitations, 122 A.L.R. 5TH 1 (2004) (cataloguing various interpretations of the
phrase).
3. David G. Owen, Special Defenses in Modern Products Liability Law, 70 MO. L.
REV. 1, 17 (2005).
4. See, e.g., Marianne M. Jennings, Reposing: An Evolving Issue, 34 REAL EST.
L.J. 470, 471 (2006).
5. See id.
6. 718 N.W.2d 865 (Minn. 2006).
7. Id. at 868. The statute states:
[N]o action by any person in contract, tort or otherwise to recover
damages for any injury to property . . . arising out of the defective and
unsafe condition of an improvement to real property . . . shall be brought
against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning,
supervision, materials, or observation of construction or construction of
the improvement to real property or against the owner of the real
property more than two years after discovery of the injury.
MINN. STAT. § 541.051, subdiv. 1(a) (2006).
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complete to qualify as an improvement to real property. Lietz
effectively expands the statute’s scope and, consequently, contracts
the corresponding tort liability. This holding deserves praise
because it produces the proper result under Minnesota’s “common
9
sense” approach to section 541.051. However, Lietz merits criticism
for its unnecessary and inaccurate foray into legislative intent
10
analysis.
This note first examines the history of section 541.051 and the
interpretive evolution of defining “improvements to real
11
12
property.”
Next, it considers the facts and holding of Lietz.
Finally, the note analyzes Lietz’s reasoning and advocates for a
13
simpler, alternative analysis leading to the same result.
II. A TALE OF TWO HISTORIES
A. Overview
The best way in which to understand the evolution of
Minnesota’s improvement to real property statute is to establish a
general history on the subject and then to trace the chronological
evolution of Minnesota’s statute in particular. The former provides
a theoretical context for evaluating Minnesota’s statute as
compared to other states. The latter shows how Minnesota has
developed its law, albeit through a clumsy waltz between case law
and statutory amendment.
B. Improvements to Real Property: A General History
1.

Privity’s Demise

Statutes of limitation terminating liability arising from
8. Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 871.
9. Pac. Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 554 (Minn.
1977) (commenting that the Wisconsin Supreme Court “avoided the vagaries of
fixture law” by determining meaning based on the language’s common usage in
Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 225 N.W.2d 454, 456 (Wis. 1975)).
10. See MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2006) (stating that legislative intent may be
considered where a statute’s meaning is not explicit); Olmanson v. LeSeuer
County, 693 N.W.2d 876, 879 (Minn. 2005) (holding that courts should not look
beyond a statute’s language if its words provide clear meaning).
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.
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improvements to real property were born of necessity.
Traditionally, architects and builders have been subjected to
15
narrow liability.
Courts achieved this restricted liability by
requiring contractual privity to impose liability on members of
16
construction professions. Certain builders enjoyed even greater
protection under the “completed and accepted” doctrine, a close
cousin of the privity defense that extinguished liability against third
parties once a builder had completed the structure and the owner
17
had accepted it. However, these types of traditional defenses were
18
not to last.
Courts began eschewing privity requirements in products
19
liability cases early in the twentieth century. The flagship case of
this trend is MacPherson v. Buick Motor, in which New York’s highest
court rejected a privity defense and permitted a subsequent user of
an automobile to maintain a negligence action against the car’s
20
manufacturer. The trend of abandoning privity requirements in
products liability cases infiltrated design and construction cases by
21
22
the late 1950s and early 1960s. In the 1956 case Hanna v. Fletcher,
for example, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia rejected
23
Subsequently,
privity requirements for claims against builders.
courts in other jurisdictions eliminated privity and other similar
defenses, like the completed and accepted doctrine, throughout
24
the middle of the twentieth century.

14. See Gerald Heller, The District of Columbia’s Architects’ and Builders’ Statute of
Repose, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 919, 924 (1985).
15. Id. at 923.
16. Jay A. Felli, Comment, The Elements of Ohio’s Liability Provisions for
Contemporary Build Architects—An Unwillingness to Expand the Plan, 17 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 109, 111–15 (1991) (tracing the historical evolution of contractual privity visà-vis improvements to real property).
17. Heller, supra note 14, at 924.
18. See Bremer, supra note 2, § 2(a).
19. See Edie Lindsay, Comment, Strict Liability and the Building Industry, 33
EMORY L.J. 175, 176–77 (1984).
20. Heller, supra note 14, at 924 n.11 (citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916)).
21. Owen, supra note 3, at 49.
22. 231 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
23. Id. at 473.
24. See Bremer, supra note 2, § 2(a). Bremer cites the following cases as
examples of courts abandoning privity requirements: Krull v. Thermogas Co.,
Division of Mapco Gas Products, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 607 (Iowa 1994) and Brennaman v.
R.M.I. Co., 639 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio 1994). Bremer, supra note 2, § 2(a) n.5.
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Losing these defenses exposed architects, builders, and
25
In response, these
construction firms to indefinite liability.
industries mobilized, lobbying to establish statutes to limit claims
26
arising from improvements to real property.
27
Several strong arguments for limiting liability existed. First,
restricted liability would protect architects, contractors, engineers,
28
and builders from the uncertainty of timeless claims.
Second,
restricted liability would make insurance rates more reasonable,
29
lowering building costs overall. Third, as a result of lower overall
30
costs, restricted liability would benefit the construction market.
With such sound policy arguments supporting statutory action, it is
not difficult to see why nearly all state legislatures capped
31
construction related liability.
Still, the enacted statutes varied. Some imposed a statute of
repose, measuring a claim’s longevity against the date of purchase
or completion; others created (as did Minnesota) a statute of
32
The
limitation triggered by the discovery of an injury.
25. Heller, supra note 14, at 924.
26. Owen, supra note 3, at 50.
27. Jennings, supra note 4, at 470.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See MINN. STAT. § 541.051 (2006); Owen, supra note 3, at 50–51. Overall,
forty-five states have enacted improvement to real property statutes; only Arizona,
Iowa, Kansas, New York, and Vermont have not. Heller, supra note 14, at 920 n.4.
Heller lists these statutes: ALA. CODE § 6-5-218 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.055
(1983); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 37-237 to 27-244 (Supp. 1983); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§
337.1, 337.15 (1972 & West Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-127 (Supp.
1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-584(a) (1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8127 (1974);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3)(c) (West 1982); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-3-50 to 9-3-53
(1982); HAW. REV. STAT. § 657-8 (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-241 (1979);
110 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 13-214 (West Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20-2
(LexisNexis Supp. 1984); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.135 (West 1979); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:2772 (1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752-A (1964); MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-108 (West 1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 260 § 2B (LexisNexis
1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5839 (West Supp. 1984) (MICH. STAT. ANN. §
27A.5839 (Callaghan 1977)); MINN. STAT. § 541.051 (1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 151-41 (Supp. 1983); MO. ANN. STAT. § 516.097 (West Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 27-2-208 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-223 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.205
(1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4-b (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1.1 (West
Supp. 1984); N.M. STAT. § 37-1-27 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(5) (1983); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-01-44 (1974); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.131 (LexisNexis
1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 109-110 (West Supp. 1983-1984); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 12.135 (1981); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5536 (West 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-129 (Supp. 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-2-630 to 15-2-670 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D.
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discrepancies further manifested themselves in differences vis-à-vis
the scope of protection, the types of actions barred, and the
equitable “grace periods” allowed for causes of action that accrue
33
near the statutory limit.
Despite their diversity, these statutes consistently generated
similar interpretive issues, such as whether the statute applied only
34
to buildings or also to building products.
Even today the
disparate statutes are still in the process of converging
jurisprudentially on challenges such as validity under the Equal
35
Protection Clause. However, without doubt, the most consistent,
and often least lucid, issue underlying these statutes is: what
constitutes an improvement to real property?
2.

A Bifurcated Solution to the Qualification Problem

In answering the question of what qualifies as an improvement
to real property, courts have usually adopted one of two
36
37
interpretive ideologies.
The first is fixture analysis.
A small
minority of courts rely on this common law analysis, which
contends that to be an improvement to real property an object
38
must qualify as a fixture. There are three components to a fixture
39
analysis. The first is permanence of the attachment to the realty,
which requires evaluating the “mode and sufficiency of annexation,
40
Second, one must determine the
either real or constructive.”
“adaptation of the article to the use and purpose of the realty,” or
rather the extent to which the improvement is necessary to use the
41
realty. The final component focuses on the intent of the party
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 15-2-9 to 15-2-11 (1967 & Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 28-3201 to 28-3-203 (1980); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5536a (Vernon Supp. 1984);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5 (1977); VA. CODE § 8.01-250 (1984); WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 4.16.300 to 4.16.320 (Supp. 1984-1985); W. VA. CODE § 55-2-6a (Supp.
1983); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.89 (West 1983); WYO. STAT. § 1-3-111 (Supp. 1984).
33. Heller, supra note 14, at 925.
34. Owen, supra note 3, at 51.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Jennings, supra note 4, at 480. Jennings
discusses equal protection issues as they relate to a statute of repose. Jennings,
supra note 4, at 480. The argument, Jennings explains, is that statutes granting
protections to certain classes of defendants and not others violates the spirit of the
Equal Protection Clause. Id.
36. Bremer, supra note 2, § 2(a).
37. Heller, supra note 14, at 932.
38. Id.
39. Bremer, supra note 2, § 2(a).
40. Id.
41. Id.
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attaching the improvement “to make a permanent addition to the
42
realty.”
One obvious advantage to fixture analysis is that its common
law roots allow for substantial case law on which courts may draw to
43
determine the status of an improvement. However, some criticize
the fixture framework; Professor Gerald Heller comments that “[a]
test based upon the vagaries of the law of fixtures has dubious value
and unnecessarily requires a court to engage in almost
metaphysical inquiries concerning the degree of annexation and
44
the intent of the annexor.” Indeed, the “vagaries” of fixture law,
whether under a fixture analysis or a common sense analysis, often
45
lead to “complex and confusing” considerations for courts.
Perhaps this is why most courts have opted for a “common
sense” (also called “common usage”) test instead of the more
46
stringent fixture analysis. The main thrust of the common sense
approach is, appropriately, determining whether the addition is an
“improvement” under the common usage or literal meaning of the
47
Admittedly, the decisions of jurisdictions invoking this
term.
more modern approach are frequently haunted by the specter of
vestigial fixture analysis; fixture factors, however, such as physical
annexation and size, often play a demonstrative, not a dispositive,
48
role in adjudication. Indeed, dispositive factors are difficult to
find in common sense interpretations, as flexibility seems to be
both the primary advantage and disadvantage of this mode of
49
statutory construction.
On one hand, the common sense
approach provides a “flexible analytical framework that can
50
accommodate the facts of a particular situation.”
Conversely,
flexible interpretive analysis also generates less consistent results,
51
lowering the predictive value of the test. Still, most jurisdictions

42. Id.
43. Id. Bremer cites various cases employing fixture analysis, including Little
by Davis v. National Services Industries, Inc., 340 S.E.2d 510 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986), Noll
by Noll v. Harrisburg Area YMCA, 643 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1994), and Karisch v. Allied-Signal,
Inc. 837 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. App. 1992).
44. Heller, supra note 14, at 934.
45. Id.
46. Bremer, supra note 2, § 2(a).
47. Heller, supra note 14, at 932.
48. Id. at 934.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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53
Minnesota is among these ranks.

52

[Vol. 34:4

As the next section discusses,

C. Improving “Improvements”: Minnesota’s Evolving Statute
1.

1965: The Enactment of Section 541.051

As mentioned above, several states adopted statutes of
54
Minnesota
limitation and repose during the 1950s and 1960s.
55
Some
enacted the first version of section 541.051 in 1965.
Minnesota practitioners have argued that the adoption was
56
“intended to provide protection to architects and builders.”
While no legislative history exists to confirm that this was the
57
legislature’s motive in enacting the statute, other sources in legal
historiography suggest that the statute was enacted in response to
58
privity’s general downfall. Indeed, Minnesota courts subsequently
59
imputed this intent to the legislature.
2.

1975: A Fledgling Adoption of Common Sense: Kloster-Madsen

The fledgling opinion in adopting the common sense
60
approach for Minnesota is Kloster-Madsen, Inc. v. Tafi’s, Inc. The
relevant facts of the case include Tafi’s contract with KlosterMadsen, a general contractor, to remodel its premises and Kloster52. Bremer, supra note 2, § 2(a) n.10. Bremer cites the following examples of
cases adopting the common sense approach: Liptak v. Diane Apartments, Inc., 167
Cal. Rptr. 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), Rose v. Fox Pool Corp., 643 A.2d 906 (Md. 1994),
Allentown Plaza Associates v. Suburban Propane Gas Corp., 405 A.2d 326 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1979), and Jones v. Ohio Building Co., 447 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl.
1982).
53. See MINN. STAT. § 541.051, subdiv. 1 (2006); Kloster-Madsen, Inc. v. Tafi’s,
Inc., 303 Minn. 59, 63–65, 226 N.W.2d 603, 607–08 (1975); infra part III.C.
54. Heller, supra note 14, at 924–25.
55. Act of May 22, 1965, ch. 524, 1965 Minn. Laws 803.
56. Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 8.
57. Kittson County v. Wells, Denbrook & Assocs., Inc., 308 Minn. 237, 241,
241 N.W.2d 799, 802 (1976), overruled by Lietz v. N. States Power Co., 718 N.W.2d
865 (Minn. 2006).
58. Id. at 242, 241 N.W.2d at 802. The Kittson court acknowledged that there
is no legislative history indicating why the legislature acted to create the
improvement-to-real-property statute. Id. at 241–42, 241 N.W.2d at 802. However,
the court cited the fact that thirty other states enacted similar statutes in a wave
just following the break-down of the privity defense; this trend, the court seemed
to say, indicates that the Minnesota legislature acted with the same motivation. Id.
59. See id.
60. 303 Minn. 59, 226 N.W.2d 603 (1975).
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Madsen’s subsequent sub-contract with an electrician to assist in
61
At issue was whether actions taken by the
the remodeling.
electrician in accordance with the remodel were “improvements” to
62
the premises under section 541.051.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the electrician’s work
63
qualified as an improvement. In reaching this conclusion, the
court invoked the Webster’s Dictionary definition of
“improvement,” which defines the term as, “a permanent addition
to or betterment of real property that enhances its capital value
and that involves the expenditure of labor or money and is
designed to make the property more useful or valuable as
64
distinguished from ordinary repairs.”
The court also stressed that the electrician’s work constituted
65
Thus,
an actual and visible beginning of the improvement.
through its reliance on dictionary definitions and descriptive
factors, like visibility, Kloster-Madsen predicted the official adoption
66
of the common sense approach in Minnesota.
3.

1976: Confirming Common Sense: Kittson

While Kloster-Madsen established Minnesota’s adoption of the
common sense approach to related real property statutes in the
previous year, Minnesota courts specifically interpreted section
67
541.051 in 1976. In Kittson County v. Wells, Denbrook & Associates,
the county brought an action against its architectural firm and
contractor for installing a defective wall finish in the county’s
68
The walling project was completed in 1966; the
courthouse.
69
courthouse walls chipped away in 1969 and 1970. The county,
70
however, did not bring suit until 1974. Thus, the suit commenced
well after the two year period normally allowed for discovery of
defective work arising from an improvement to real property had
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 61–62, 226 N.W.2d at 606.
Id.
Id. at 64, 226 N.W.2d at 607.
Id. at 63, 226 N.W.2d at 607 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1138 (1971)).
65. Id. at 607, 226 N.W.2d at 64.
66. See Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 9.
67. Kittson County v. Wells, Denbrook & Assocs., Inc., 308 Minn. 237, 242,
241 N.W.2d 799, 802 (1976), overruled by Lietz v. N. States Power Co., 718 N.W.2d
865 (Minn. 2006).
68. Id. at 239, 241 N.W.2d at 800.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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71

expired. The county’s claims were contractual, including breach
72
of contract and breach of warranty.
The issue facing the court in Kittson was whether the wall
finishing qualified as an improvement to real property under
73
Recast, the issue became whether the statute
section 541.051.
74
applied to both contract and tort actions. Ultimately, the court
concluded that the statute applied only to tort actions and that
because the county’s claims were contract based, they fell outside
75
Accordingly, both of the county’s claims
the statute’s scope.
76
survived under the longer applicable statute of limitations. The
77
It chose to
court was cautious in coming to this conclusion.
construe section 541.051 strictly, stating that the uncertain scope of
the statute may not fairly apprise persons affected by its terms of its
78
effect on their activities. The court further emphasized that the
statute’s short “discovery” and nullification provisions could work
79
harsh results on affected litigants. Finally, the court noted that
certain aspects of the statute, particularly the ten year nullification
80
provision, may present constitutional problems.
Based on this limited construction, the court decided to
restrict the statute’s scope to tort actions by third parties against
persons “performing or furnishing the design, planning,
supervision, or observation of construction or construction of such
81
improvement to real estate.” Of course, this reading eliminates
82
contract claims from being affected by the statute.
While the
court conceded that the statute itself does not use the term “tort,” it
supported its reading on several grounds, contending that because
the statute’s language is derived from the tort lexicon, the statute’s
83
application should be confined to tort actions. First, the court
argued the statute refers to “injury” to property; second, the court
required that “an injury arise out of the ‘defective and unsafe’
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id. at 242, 241 N.W.2d at 802.
See id. at 241, 241 N.W.2d at 801.
Id. See also Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 8–9.
Kittson, 308 Minn. at 242–43, 241 N.W.2d at 802.
Id. at 243, 241 N.W.2d at 802.
See id.
Id. at 240, 241 N.W.2d at 801.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 241, 241 N.W.2d at 801.
Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 8.
Kittson, 308 Minn. at 241–42, 241 N.W.2d at 801–02.
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84

condition of an improvement to real property.” Last, the court
noted that the use of the phrase “proximate cause” in the final
85
sentence of subdivision 1 was suggestive of the statute’s tort focus.
Underlying this tort-centric construction is the court’s use of
86
The court acknowledged that no
legislative intent analysis.
legislative history existed to inform the court as to the statute’s
87
exact purpose.
However, the legislature enacted Minnesota’s
statute at a time when at least thirty other jurisdictions adopted
88
similar statutes. These statutes, the court noted, were created to
protect architects and builders from tort liability to third parties
89
after the destruction of the privity doctrine in the early 1960s.
Based on this speculative analysis of legislative motive, the
court concluded that its strict construction “does no more than
90
confine the application of the statute to its legislative purpose.”
Moreover, the court noted, other states’ statutes include more
expansive language that specifically incorporates contract or
warranty claims, indicating that Minnesota was free to follow suit
91
but chose not to.
4.

1977: Common Sense for Section 541.051: Pacific

While Kittson focused on the scope of section 541.051, Pacific
92
Indemnity Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc. examined the statute’s
93
Pacific arose out of a fire in a strip mall in
constitutionality.
94
Rochester, Minnesota. The fire department, in conjunction with
both a fire investigator and an engineer, determined that the
95
origin of the fire was a particular furnace. The court, however,
noted that several competing theories existed as to how the fire
96
actually started. The principle theory posited that the furnace was
97
installed too close to the wall. This created a carbon build up
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 239, 241 N.W.2d at 801.
Id. at 241, 241 N.W.2d at 801–02.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 241–42, 241 N.W.2d at 802. See discussion supra Part B.1.
Kittson, 308 Minn. at 242, 241 N.W.2d at 802.
See id. at 242–43, 241 N.W.2d at 802.
260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1977).
Id. at 553.
Id. at 551.
Id.
Id. at 551–52.
Id. at 552.
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behind the wall’s sheetrock; the carbon later ignited, starting the
98
fire. A second theory stated that a combination of events related
to the carbonization process precipitated the blowing of oil onto a
99
hot furnace access door, causing ignition. The final theory, called
the “combustible materials” theory, simply hypothesized that paper
and cardboard boxes placed near the furnace had ignited and that
100
the fire had spread from there.
These diverse theories foretold of the myriad defendants
named in the case; they included the furnace installation company,
the company that serviced the furnace, a tenant on the premises
where the furnace was located, the furnace manufacturer, and the
101
owner of the shopping center.
These multiple defendants from
distinct classes of professionals set the stage for examining Pacific’s
main issue: the constitutionality of section 541.051 (as it existed in
102
1977).
The trial court found that the statute was “not
unconstitutional” and held that the statute was inapplicable to
Pacific’s fact pattern because the furnace, its installation, and its
103
maintenance did not qualify as an improvement to real property.
The Minnesota Supreme Court differed significantly in its holding.
First, it found that the installation of the furnace did constitute an
improvement to real property and thus fell under the scope of the
104
105
statute. Second, it held that the statute was unconstitutional.
Several elements of the court’s statutory and constitutional
analysis are worth examining. First, in discussing the statute’s
106
applicability, the court squarely rejected a fixture law analysis.
Such a declaration was clearly necessary because the trial court in
Pacific used fixture analysis to determine that the furnace was not
an improvement since it could easily be removed and was therefore
107
not a part of real property.
Looking to four similar cases, the
108
The
supreme court noted that only one used fixture analysis.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 553.
103. Id. at 553–54.
104. Id. at 554.
105. Id. at 555.
106. Id. at 554. See also Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 9.
107. Pacific, 260 N.W.2d at 553–54.
108. Id. at 554 (citing Smith v. Allen-Bradley Co., 371 F. Supp. 698 (W.D. Va.
1974); Rosenberg v. Town of N. Bergen, 293 A.2d 662 (N.J. 1971); Yakima Fruit &
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court then relied on Kittson as well as the adoption of the common
sense approach in Wisconsin to justify establishing the common
109
sense approach in Minnesota.
This approach, the court
explained, would avoid the “vagaries” of fixture law and permit
determination of section 541.051’s meaning “on the basis of the
110
common usage of language.”
Second, in defending its constitutional analysis, the court
111
The court
looked to history and comparative jurisprudence.
began by establishing that Minnesota likely enacted the statute as
part of the trend in other states to protect architects, engineers,
112
The court’s
and contractors from liability to third parties.
reasoning implied that following this trend made constitutional
challenges to Minnesota’s statute comparable to constitutional
113
challenges to related statutes in other states.
According to the court, fifteen other courts had ruled on the
constitutionality of similar statutes in 1977, and, of those, five had
114
struck them down as unconstitutional.
Despite the majority of states upholding the constitutionality
of similar statutes, the Minnesota Supreme Court struck the statute
115
The court defended its decision on the premise that
down.
legislative classifications must apply uniformly to all persons who
are similarly situated and that distinctions separating the classes
116
must be natural and reasonable, not fanciful and arbitrary. The
court further explained that section 541.051 contravenes this
premise because it grants special immunity to a class of persons

Cold Storage Co. v. Cent. Heating & Plumbing Co., 503 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1972);
Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 225 N.W.2d 454 (Wis. 1975)). Of the four
cases cited, all but Smith employed a common sense analysis. Id. The court in
Yakima used the approach to determine that a refrigeration system was not an
improvement. Yakima, 503 P.2d at 110. In Rosenberg the court found defective
street pavement was an improvement. Rosenberg, 293 A.2d at 666. In Kallas the
court concluded that a fire sprinkler system was an improvement. Kallas, 225
N.W.2d at 456. However, in Smith, a federal court in Virginia used a fixture
analysis to find that a five-tone die-cutting machine was a “fixture” even though it
could be moved. Smith, 371 F. Supp. at 700–01.
109. Pacific, 260 N.W.2d at 554.
110. Id. (quoting Kallas, 225 N.W.2d at 456).
111. See id. at 554–55.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 555.
114. Id. Those five states were Alabama, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, and
Wisconsin. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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(the construction professionals listed in the statute) without a
rational basis for regarding those professionals as part of a special
117
group that warranted bestowing of particular immunities.
In
other words, the statute lacked a rational basis for excluding
owners and material suppliers from protection, violating the
118
concept of equal protection.
5.

1980: Reacting to Pacific: Statutory Amendments

Following Pacific’s invalidation of section 541.051, Minnesota
construction law faced a practical problem. A missing statute of
119
Unfortunately, that
limitations is every trial lawyer’s nightmare.
nightmare became a reality when constitutional invalidation
coupled with legislative inaction left the state without a statute of
120
limitations regarding improvements to real property.
To remedy the situation, the Minnesota legislature amended
121
section 541.051 in 1980, drafting the version that exists today.
Originally, the statute read:
Except where fraud is involved, no action to recover
damages for any injury to property, real or personal, or
for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the
defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real
property, nor any action for contribution or indemnity for
damages sustained on account of such injury, shall be
brought against any person performing or furnishing the
design, planning, supervision, or observation of
construction or construction of such improvement to real
property more than two years after discovery thereof, nor,
in any event, more than ten years after the completion of
122
such construction.
Following the amendment, the statute read:
Except where fraud is involved no action by any person in
contract, tort, or otherwise to recover damages for any injury
to property, real or personal, or for bodily injury or
wrongful death, arising out of the defective and unsafe
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 8.
120. Id. (referring to construction-related litigation governed by section
541.051 in the late 1970s).
121. Id. at 28 (noting that the legislature amended other sections of the statute
in 1988).
122. MINN. STAT. § 541.051, subdiv. 1 (1968).
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condition of an improvement to real property, nor any
action for contribution or indemnity for damages
sustained on account of the injury, shall be brought
against any person performing or furnishing the design,
planning, supervision, materials, or observation of
construction or construction of the improvement to real
property or against the owner of the real property more than
two years after the discovery thereof, nor, in any event
shall such cause of action accrue more than 15 years after
123
substantial completion of the construction.
These legislative changes responded to Kittson by revising the
124
They further show how
statute to encompass non-tort actions.
the legislature rectified constitutional problems with the statute by
expanding its scope to individuals, thereby avoiding equal
125
protection problems. Minnesota courts subsequently upheld the
126
new language as constitutional.
Because the statute effectively did not exist from 1977 through
the enactment of the 1980 amendments, there were few cases in
127
the early 1980s interpreting the section. Plaintiffs in that period
were able to take advantage of a loophole that created timeless
liability for claims accruing prior to the effective date of the 1980
128
amendments. The enactment of the amendments combined with
the construction boom of the early 1980s, though, led to a
significant increase in litigation on the statute later in that
129
decade. Much of this litigation focused on causation issues under
130
the statute’s “defective and unsafe condition” clause.
Indeed,
Minnesota has long grappled with what injuries “arise out of”
131
For the purposes of
conditions that are “defective and unsafe.”

123. MINN. STAT. § 541.051, subdiv. 1 (1980) (emphasis added).
124. Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 25.
125. Id. at 9.
126. Id. at 8–9. The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the amended statute in Calder v. City of Crystal, 318 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1982).
127. Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 9.
128. Edward D. Mulally & Mark Bloomquist, Limitation of Actions Involving
Improvements to Real Property: Scope and Applicability of Minn. Stat. § 541.051, 13
MINN. TRIAL LAW. 16, 16 (1988).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 18. See also Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 24–28. Both
articles discuss the case law evolution of interpreting “defective and unsafe”
conditions that cause injuries under the statute.
131. See, e.g., Pac. Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 553–
54 (Minn. 1977) (holding, under a previous version of section 541.051, that
negligence during installation can lead to a “defective and unsafe” condition).
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132

Lietz, however, these issues were sufficiently settled.
Rather, the
scope of “improvement to real property” is the lynchpin of Lietz
and the next critical jurisprudential step in determining the reach
of section 541.051. Thus, the 1980s case law that matters for Lietz is
that which discusses the common sense standard of interpreting
what qualifies as an improvement to real property.
6.

1984: A Federal Standard: Adair

By 1984, the interpretation of section 541.051 and statutes like
it across the country had undergone several permutations.
Minnesota had enacted the statute as a way to protect vulnerable
construction professionals from third-party liability after privity
133
A decade later, the Minnesota Supreme Court
defenses died.
interpreted a similar statute under a plain language approach in
134
Kloster-Madsen.
Shortly thereafter, the court specifically revised
the scope of section 541.051 in Kittson by confining its application
135
to tort actions. Just one year later, the court addressed the statute
again by establishing a common sense approach to interpreting its
136
language and invalidating certain sections as unconstitutional.
Finally, the legislature acted to correct and clarify problems
137
addressed in Kittson and Pacific through amendments in 1980,
making the statute a ripe target for refining the judiciary’s
interpretive approach.
138
In 1984, Adair v. Koppers Co., a Sixth Circuit case, established
a methodology for interpreting improvement to real property
139
statutes under a common sense approach. In Adair, an industrial
worker was injured when his right arm was caught in a conveyor
132. See generally Mulally & Bloomquist, supra note 128, at 18 (noting that there
was originally no distinction between “defective” and “unsafe,” and that courts
would even delete the latter in opinions). Minnesota courts eventually ruled that
the words were not synonymous, but commentators pointed out that “unsafe”
means risk to human life. Id. Therefore, reading the words as independent would
render section 541.051 applicable only to personal injury and not also to property
damage as the statute specifically enumerates. This phrase remains unclear. Lietz,
however, satisfies both elements, dealing with a bent anchor, the installation of
which put human life at risk.
133. Id. See also Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 8; supra Part II.C.1.
134. See supra Part II.C.2.
135. See supra Part II.C.3.
136. See supra Part II.C.4.
137. See supra Part II.C.5.
138. 741 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1984).
139. Id. at 114.
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140

belt. The belt, part of an oven, had been designed and installed
by the plant’s previous owner and had not been modified since
141
1949.
Adair brought his suit in 1981, well beyond the statute of
142
repose that would potentially apply to the machinery. He argued
that the conveyor belt did not qualify as an “improvement to real
143
property” and was thus outside the statute’s scope.
The court
ultimately determined that the oven was an improvement to real
144
property and that the statute applied.
In reaching its holding, the court defined improvements to
145
Providing its
real property under a common sense approach.
definition of “improvement to real property,” Adair cited to both
Pacific, which established the same common sense definition in
Minnesota, and to Kallas, the Wisconsin case on which Minnesota
146
justified its adoption of the definition. Next, the court identified
147
factors to use in interpreting this definition.
First, the
improvement must be an integral component of the overall system
148
Second, the
or real property it purportedly improves.
improvement should add value to the realty it was intended to
149
150
improve. Third, the improvement should be useful. Finally, it
151
should be permanent.
Several states, including Minnesota, have incorporated the
152
Indeed,
common sense factors iterated in Adair’s methodology.
given that Adair invoked Minnesota case law and even the
Wisconsin case law through which Minnesota justified its approach,
140. Id. at 112.
141. Id.
142. Id. It is also important to note that while Adair deals with a statute of
repose, not a statute of limitation as Lietz does, the main issue of the case is simply
interpreting what qualifies as an improvement to real property. Thus, the
distinction between the two types of liability limitation is immaterial.
143. Id. at 113. The Sixth Circuit noted that in Adair, the Ohio Supreme Court
had not interpreted the phrase “improvement to real property” under Ohio’s
statute. Id. Thus, the Sixth Circuit conceded that it must “make a considered
educated guess” as to the phrase’s interpretation. Id.
144. Id. at 114.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 115–16.
148. Id. at 115.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 116.
152. Bremer, supra note 2, § 2(a). Minnesota cases following Adair, include,
for example, Sartori v. Harnischfeger Corp., 432 N.W.2d 448 (Minn. 1998) and
Fredrickson v. Johnson, 402 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. 1987).
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153

it seems natural that Minnesota imported the Adair framework.
Some jurisdictions have adopted similar factors but use alternate
154
sources to define “improvement to real property.” Despite these
discrepancies, Adair is significant persuasive precedent for its
widespread use as a base for interpreting common sense definitions
155
under improvement to real property statutes.
7.

1988 and Beyond: “Improvements” Under Construction

Even after more than two decades of interpretation, section
156
Judicial applications of the
541.051 remained an enigmatic law.
statute generated befuddling and even paradoxical results,
providing little predictive value about what truly qualifies as an
157
improvement to real property.
Minnesota has effectively
managed this uncertainty in the twenty years following the statute’s
enactment—the court has ruled on only nine cases involving the
158
statute in that period.
However, the construction boom of the 1980s swelled litigation
under section 541.051. From 1986 through 1988, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals together with the Minnesota Supreme Court
issued eighteen rulings on section 541.051, double the number of

153. See Adair, 741 F.2d at 114.
154. Bremer, supra note 2, § 2(a). Bremer notes that some jurisdictions use a
four factor test including: value added, the nature of the improvement, the
relationship of the improvement to the land and its occupants, and permanence.
Id. Other jurisdictions look only at three factors: value enhancement, the
expenditure of labor or money, and intent to make a property more useful or
valuable. Id. § 10(b).
155. Id. § 2(a).
156. Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 34.
157. Jennings, supra note 4, at 476. Minnesota has found the following to be
improvements: walls, panic doors, storm sewers, hardwired smoke detector
systems, unfinished stairwells, permanently installed electrical cables, and
escalators. Id. at 475–76. Minnesota has found the following not to be
improvements: large steel tubes, cement blocks for a wall, and church altars. Id.
See also Mulally & Bloomquist, supra note 128, at 17. According to Mulally and
Bloomquist, the supreme court has found the following to be an improvement to
real property under the statute: rock-crushing machines, light fixtures and ballasts,
electrical transmission cables that are part of a larger transmission system,
electrical transformer vaults, and wooden posts that are part of birdfeeders. Id.
The pair also notes that parties at the appellate level did not even dispute that the
following would qualify as improvements under the statute: septic systems,
fireplaces, storm sewers, electrical switchboards, water drainage systems, floor
drains, roof flashing, ceiling mortar, and patios. Id. at 17–18.
158. Id. at 16.
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159

opinions on the statute in the previous two decades.
This
160
explosion in litigation further exposed the statute’s weaknesses.
The statute’s mystery is not limited to what qualifies as an
improvement to real property either. The statute’s causation
clause, which requires that an injury must arise from the “defective
or unsafe condition” of the improvement, has also caused
jurisprudential consternation, as have provisions related to when
161
the statute of limitations begins to run. The legislature addressed
the latter issue in its 1988 amendment, which clarified that the
section’s statute of limitations begins to run upon the discovery of a
plaintiff’s injury, not upon the discovery of the defective or unsafe
162
condition. The same amendment also clarified related provisions
163
regarding contribution and indemnity under the statute.
The legislature continues to tinker with section 541.051 to this
day. For example, in the 2006 session, State Senator Don Betzold
introduced an amendment to section 541.051 to change
164
contribution and indemnity language. Although this amendment
focused on a different part of section 541.051, it demonstrates the
extent to which the entire statute continues to require further
clarification and work. Of course, the work of improving a statute
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 18. See Lietz v. N. States Power Co., 718 N.W.2d 865, 872 (Minn.
2006) (discussing this issue, but noting that negligence during installation had
already been established as an appropriate action under the statute).
162. Mulally & Bloomquist, supra note 128, at 31.
163. Id. at 32.
164. S.F. 241, 85th Sess. § 4 (Minn. 2007); E-mail from Senator Don Betzold,
Minn. State Senate, to author, Katherine Johansen, William Mitchell Coll. of Law
(May 18, 2007, 18:18:00 CST) (on file with the William Mitchell Law Review)
[hereinafter E-mail from Senator Don Betzold]. Senator Betzold, the bill’s author
stated, “[t]he bill was heard and passed from the Senate Judiciary Committee, but
I have not taken that bill up for procedural reasons.” E-mail from Senator Don
Betzold. Senator Betzold also stated that the Minnesota State Bar Association and
the Builders Association of Minnesota requested the changes in response to Weston
v. McWilliams, 716 N.W.2d 634 (Minn. 2006), another Minnesota Supreme Court
case decided within weeks of Lietz. Id. However, no group or legislator has
requested changes in response to Lietz’s holding, indicating that Lietz comports
with the statute’s purpose.
Id.
Moreover, according to the Minnesota
Legislature’s bill tracking system, no amendments regarding “improvements to
real property” have been introduced.
Minnesota State Legislature,
http://www.leg.state.mn.us/leg/legis.asp (last visited Feb. 14, 2008). Legislative
publications likewise reveal that legislators have not taken up this issue. See The
Minnesota Senate Briefly, http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/briefly/ (last visited
Feb. 14, 2008); The Session Weekly, http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hinfo/
swmain.asp (last visited Feb. 14, 2008).
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rests not only on the shoulders of the legislature but also in the
hands of the judiciary; legislative amendments must be properly
upheld by clear judicial interpretation. Thus, case law contributes
significantly to the understanding of section 541.051. Indeed, Lietz
is just the latest case law contribution to understanding Minnesota’s
enduringly problematic improvement to real property statutes.
III. THE LIETZ CASE
165

The story of Lietz starts out, literally, with a bang. The claims
in question arose when workers pierced a natural gas pipeline,
166
which led to an explosion that damaged a Taco John’s restaurant.
The parties and chronology involved unfold as follows. In
1998, Seren Innovations hired Sirti Limited (Sirti) to design a
167
telecommunications system in downtown St. Cloud, Minnesota.
Sirti in turn employed Cable Constructors, Inc. (CCI) for
168
installation. Northern States Power (NSP) supplied the area with
169
natural gas. On December 11, 1998, CCI began to install a utility
pole support anchor (anchor) to stabilize and balance fiber-optic
170
cables. Undertaking its work, the crew demolished the sidewalk,
placed an auger, or “anchor cranker,” on top of their anchor, and
171
burrowed into the ground.
After having delved eighteen to
twenty-four inches below, the anchor struck a hard object, later
172
determined to be a granite slab.
The crew attempted to break
through the object by removing the auger and striking the slab with
a sledgehammer; the workers then replaced the auger and
173
Activity continued smoothly until, when the
continued boring.
anchor sat twelve to eighteen inches above the ground’s surface,
the workers smelled gas and noticed dirt blowing away from the
174
anchor’s hole.

165. Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 868.
166. See id. at 868; Lietz v. N. States Power Co., No. A04-901, 2005 WL 44905, at
*1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2005).
167. Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 868.
168. Id.
169. Brief of Defendant-Respondent at 2, Lietz v. N. States Power Co., 718
N.W.2d 865 (Minn. 2006) (No. A04-901), 2005 WL 4662973.
170. Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 868.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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The workers realized they had struck a gas line and notified
175
the crew foreman. Unfortunately, the gas spread and less than an
hour later caused an explosion that killed four, injured many
176
others, and damaged surrounding buildings.
Jaenty, Inc.
(Jaenty), which owned the nearby Taco John’s restaurant, alleged
that its building was among those that sustained damage and
177
sought compensation on a negligence cause of action. However,
Jaenty did not commence its action until sometime between late
2001 and early 2002, approximately three years after the
178
explosion.
Section 541.051 establishes a two year statute of limitations on
claims arising from the defective and unsafe condition of an
179
improvement to real property.
Jaenty admitted that it brought
suit after the period expired but contended that the statute did not
180
apply.
NSP argued that the statute did apply and that it barred
181
Jaenty’s claim.
The district court granted NSP’s motion for summary
182
judgment. The district court used the state’s accepted definition
of an “improvement to real property” as one that includes a
“permanent addition to or betterment of real property,” in holding
that the anchor installation process completed at the time of the
183
The
explosion qualified as an improvement under the statute.
district court’s holding is important in two ways. First, it reflects the
correct interpretation of the statute under a plain meaning
184
analysis. Second, it is the supreme court’s basis for asserting that
185
While
the issue of incomplete installation is proper for appeal.
Jaenty neglected to argue that the anchor was not an improvement
under the statute because its installation was incomplete, the
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Brief of Respondents Sirti, Ltd., Cable Constructors, Inc., and Seren
Innovations, Inc. at 2, Lietz v. N. States Power Co., 718 N.W.2d 865 (Minn. 2006)
(No. A04-901), 2005 WL 4662972 (noting that Jaenty had already been
compensated under its insurance policy, so its insurer, Travelers Insurance
Company, also had a stake in the case’s outcome).
178. Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 868.
179. MINN. STAT. § 541.051, subdiv. 1 (2006).
180. Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 869.
181. Id.
182. See id.
183. Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 869–70.
184. Lietz v. N. States Power Co., No. A04-901, 2005 WL 44905, at *2, *4
(Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2005).
185. Id.
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supreme court held the issue was sufficiently preserved for appeal
because the district court’s holding relied on a definition of an
improvement to real property that invoked the quality of
186
permanence, a temporal aspect of real property.
187
A split appellate court affirmed.
The majority cited three
reasons for categorizing the anchor installation as an improvement
188
to real property. First, the court explained that, “the anchor was
a permanent addition to or betterment of real property as it was . . .
189
installed during the course of a larger improvement.”
Second,
“the anchor enhanced the capital value of the property,” and third,
the installation “involved the expenditure of both labor and
190
The appellate court also addressed the argument that
money.”
the anchor and auger constituted construction activity instead of an
191
The majority rejected this
improvement to real property.
argument, instead holding that the anchor constituted an
improvement under the plain meaning of the statute and in
192
comparison to previous cases.

186. Id.
187. Id. at *4 (holding that the anchor was an improvement under section
541.051). The dissent contended the anchor was not permanent and thus not
such an improvement. Id. at *4–*5 (Schumacher, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at *2.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at *2, *3 (explaining that Brandt v. Hallwood Management Co., 560
N.W.2d 396 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), cited by the appellant, is distinguishable
because the activities in question in the case were not integral to the overall
improvement, as is the installation of the anchor to the completion of the fiberoptic cable system in Lietz). The court also cited Wiita v. Potlatch Corp., 492 N.W.2d
270 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) as a more promising precedent for the appellants, but
subsequently distinguished it as well, noting that the injuries in Wiita were not
causally connected to the improvement to real property in that case. Lietz, 2005
WL 44905 at *3.
192. Id. at *2. The appellate court applied the Adair factors and found that the
anchor was a permanent addition that was integral to the course of a larger
improvement. Id. See also supra Part II.C.6 (discussing the Adair factors). It also
found that the anchor enhanced the property’s value by allowing the fiber-optic
cable system to be installed, and that the installation required the expenditure of
labor and money. Lietz, 2005 WL 44905 at *2. Along with these factors, the court
noted that cases in which construction activity, as opposed to improvement to real
property, was the focus, were distinguishable from the facts of Lietz. Id. Finally,
the court mentioned that the facts of Lietz compared favorably with cases in which
the statute had previously ensnared activities as improvements to real property. Id.
Specifically, the court mentions Lederman v. Cragun’s Pine Beach Resort, 247 F.3d
812, 815 (8th Cir. 2001), in which digging a trench in preparation for a
construction project qualified as an improvement. Lietz, 2005 WL 44905 at *2.
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Even more notably, the court waved the flag of opportunity,
stating that “no Minnesota court has ever limited the application of
section 541.051 to projects that have been actually completed and
193
turned over to the property owner.” The appellate court further
condemned the idea of such a limitation on the statute’s
application, commenting that “[s]uch an application of the statute
would place undue restriction on the statute of limitations, thereby
allowing the statute to be applicable in only those situations where
194
a cause of action arose following completion of the project.”
195
Jaenty appealed,
arguing that the anchor was not an
improvement because its installation was incomplete at the time of
injury and that the negligence involved failed to meet statutory
196
requirements.
The supreme court resolved both issues for the
197
198
Turning to precedent, the majority noted that
defendants.
199
negligence during the installation process, as occurred here,
meets the “defective and unsafe condition” requirement of section
200
541.051. When defining improvements however, the court hastily
invoked an elaborate search for statutory meaning. Contending
that the statute supported definitions that included or excluded
201
incomplete improvements, the majority declared the statute
202
ambiguous and proceeded to legislative intent analysis.
203
First, the court examined the need and occasion for the law
and found that the legislature’s 1980 amendment ensnared
incomplete improvements because “the legislature had a broader
purpose for section 541.051 than simply limiting the liability
exposure which occurred after the erosion of the privity of contract

193. Lietz, 2005 WL 44905 at *3.
194. Id.
195. See Lietz v. N. States Power Co., 718 N.W.2d 865, 869 n.1 (Minn. 2006).
Despite little attention to the issue in lower courts, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that Jaenty sufficiently preserved for appeal the issue of whether the
incompletely installed anchor qualified as an improvement. Id.
196. Id. at 869.
197. Id. at 871 (concluding that the anchor qualifies as an improvement), 873
(concluding that the injuries were due to the condition of the anchor).
198. Id. at 871–72 (citing Griebel v. Andersen Corp., 489 N.W.2d 521 (Minn.
1992)).
199. Id. at 872.
200. Id. at 872 (citing Pac. Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d
548, 552–55 (Minn. 1977)).
201. Id. at 870.
202. Id.
203. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 645.16(1) (2006)).
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204

doctrine.”
Second, the court looked to the particular
205
consequences of excluding incomplete improvements, observing
that the narrower interpretation would precipitate difficult
determinations regarding when an improvement was “completely
206
installed.” Based on these two points, the majority ruled that the
207
legislature’s intent was to include incomplete improvements.
Conversely, the dissent looked to the dictionary definitions of
208
It concluded that such
language used in the statute.
improvements fall outside the statute because they are not
“permanent” under the established definition of “improvement to
209
The improvements were not “permanent,” the
real property.”
dissent concluded, because the anchor was still “being installed and
210
was not yet ‘stable’” when the rupture occurred. Still, the dissent
conceded, the anchor may qualify as an improvement under the
211
statute eventually.
IV. ANALYSIS
Lietz demonstrates that the wrong means can sometimes lead
to the right end and that even a well-wrought path can veer off
course. One charts the best path to Lietz’s destination by
employing the common sense, plain meaning approach of the
dissent, which, if properly executed, leads to the majority’s holding
that the anchor qualifies as an improvement under statutory
language and case law definitions.
A. Legislative Intent: A Majority Gone Awry
Despite its clear holding, Lietz offers only confused reasoning;
212
the majority manufactures statutory ambiguity, wrongly interprets

204. Id. at 871.
205. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 645.16(6) (2006)).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 873–74 (Page, J., dissenting).
209. Id. For a more detailed analysis of Justice Page’s dissent, see infra Part
IV.C.
210. Id. at 874.
211. See id.
212. According to Current Technology Concepts, Inc. v. Irie Enterprises, Inc., 530
N.W.2d 539, 543 (Minn. 1995), a statute is ambiguous if it supports multiple
interpretations. Also, section 645.16 permits legislative intent analysis only if a
statute is unclear. MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2006). Yet, section 541.051 has a clear
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the 1980 amendments, and rightly but unnecessarily predicts the
213
consequences of alternate outcomes.
First, Lietz’s legislative intent analysis is unnecessary because
214
As is discussed below, a plain
section 541.051 is unambiguous.
meaning reading is sufficient to resolve the issue of when
215
improvements to real property begin under the statute. Treading
unnecessarily into legislative intent analysis presents the potential
for needless confusion regarding a statute with an already confused
216
history.
Second, Lietz’s analysis is partially inaccurate. The court
correctly identifies that the statute’s original purpose was to protect
217
builders and construction contractors from liability.
The

meaning. See MINN. STAT. § 541.051 (2006). As I will later address, the statute’s
clear meaning renders further analysis unnecessary. See infra Part IV.C.
213. See Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 870–71.
214. While not controlling in Minnesota, the Adair court established that the
meaning of “improvement to real property” is the definition adopted from Pacific;
thus, there is no ambiguity as to the phrase’s meaning. Adair v. Koppers Co., 741
F.2d 111, 114 (6th Cir. 1984). Furthermore, the phrase’s words have clear
dictionary definitions. Id. Thus, while legislative action and judicial interpretation
regarding the statute have been unclear, the meaning of the statute’s words is
clear.
215. See infra Part IV.C.
216. Legislative intent analysis is a perilous undertaking regardless of the state
of the current statute. Justice Antonin Scalia states his thoughts on judicial efforts
to divine legislative intent: “My view that the objective indication of the words,
rather than the intent of the legislature, is what constitutes the law leads me, of
course, to the conclusion that legislative history should not be used as an
authoritative indication of a statute’s meaning.” ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 30 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
Tracing the evolution of legislative history, Scalia recalls the joke that “one should
consult the text of the statute only when the legislative history is ambiguous.” Id.
at 31. He laments that this joke is no longer funny, quoting a brief that began:
“Unfortunately, the legislative debates are not helpful. Thus we turn to the other
guidepost in this difficult area, statutory language.” Id. Even judges who have a
more generous view of legislative intent analysis, such as Scalia’s colleague Justice
Breyer, contend that most judges start by looking first to the statute’s language,
structure, and history to determine its purpose before delving into legislative
intent analysis.
See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 86 (Alfred K. Knopf ed., 2005). The words of
Minnesota’s improvement to real property statutes have clear definitions; thus, a
predisposition to be inclined or disinclined to legislative intent is irrelevant.
Scholars favorable to and skeptical of the practice look first to the words, which
are sufficient to resolve the issues in Lietz, making legislative intent analysis
unnecessary, regardless of its theoretical value.
217. See Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 870 (quoting Kittson County v. Wells, Denbrook &
Assocs., 308 Minn. 237, 241–42, 241 N.W.2d 799, 802 (1976)). Mysteriously, the
court did not employ this applicable and widely accepted legislative intent analysis
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majority, however, fails to properly define the purpose of the 1980
218
Neither the occasion nor the need for the
amendment.
amendment is related to interpreting the phrase “improvements to
219
real property.”
Rather, the amendment only expands section
541.051 by bringing non-tort actions within the statute’s reach and
220
remedying unrelated constitutional issues.
In effect, the
amendment is neutral because Jaenty’s negligence claim would
221
Thus, the court
have qualified even before the 1980 changes.
makes an untenable leap in proclaiming that the amendment was
somehow meant to broaden the scope of “improvements to real
222
property.”
The majority fares better in asserting that excluding
unfinished improvements would force courts to draw difficult
distinctions “between ‘partially-installed’ items that are not covered
by [the statute] and ‘completely-installed’ improvements that are
223
The argument is strong, but because the court’s
covered.”
analysis should never have reached this point, it is alas, superfluous.
Moreover, requiring items’ installation to be “complete” simply
begs the question: what qualifies as “complete”?
B. Strict Construction: A Dissent Gone Astray
The dissent travels the more promising path of strict
construction in its analysis. Adhering to Minnesota’s established

by reasoning that incomplete improvements should be included to protect related
industries from excess liability. Id.
218. See Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 8 (noting that the 1980
amendment was in response to constitutional concerns and that the court clearly
responded to the amendment in Calder v. City of Crystal, 318 N.W.2d 838 (Minn.
1982)).
219. See Samuel D. Heins, Architects in Minnesota Law, 51 HENNEPIN LAW. 15, 16
n.13 (Nov.–Dec. 1981).
220. Compare MINN. STAT. § 541.051 (2006), with MINN. STAT. § 541.051 (1966).
221. See § 541.051 (1966); Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 872. The fact that Jaenty
represents a third-party interest is likewise unimportant. Minnesota held in Jack v.
Applebaum’s Food Markets, Inc., 280 Minn. 247, 250, 158 N.W.2d 857, 860 (1968),
that the statute does not bar negligence actions by third parties.
222. See Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 871 (citing no legislative history for this assertion,
confining its reasoning to one quixotic sentence: “This amendment indicates that
the legislature had a broader purpose for section 541.051 than simply limiting the
liability exposure which occurred after the erosion of the privity of contract
doctrine.”).
223. Id.
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224

interpretive approach, Justice Page mapped out the statute, the
common law definition of “improvements to real property,” and
the common sense definitions of the pertinent words:
225
“permanent,” “addition,” and “betterment.”
In laying out his argument, Justice Page dealt first with the
language of the statute, which reads, “no action . . . arising out of
the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real
property . . . shall be brought . . . more than two years after
226
discovery of the injury . . . .”
Next, he invoked the Pacific definition of “improvement to real
property,” reminding readers that such an improvement must be “a
permanent addition to or betterment of real property that
enhances its capital value and that involves the expenditure of
labor or money and is designed to make property more useful or
227
valuable as distinguished from ordinary repairs.” Notably, Justice
Page also cited to Pacific to establish the statutory construction rule
that the court must give “effect to the plain meaning of the words
of the statute without resort to technical legal constructions of its
228
terms.”
With this base established, Justice Page introduced the
dictionary definitions of “permanent,” “addition,” and
229
“betterment.”
“Permanent” means “continuing or enduring (as
in the same state, status, place) without fundamental or marked
change: not subject to fluctuation or alteration: fixed or intended
230
to be fixed: lasting, stable.”
In applying this definition, the
dissent swerved lethally when it concluded that an improvement
231
must be complete to be “permanent.”
The dissent’s reasoning
purported that common sense (in the colloquial, not the
interpretive, sense) dictates that the anchor was not stable,
meaning it was not continuing or enduring without fundamental or
marked change and not fixed or intended to be fixed, because it

224. See MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2006); Pac. Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger,
Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 554 (Minn. 1977).
225. Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 873–74 (Page, J., dissenting) (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1683 (1993)).
226. Id. at 873 (citing MINN. STAT. § 541.051, subdiv. 1(a) (2004)).
227. Id. at 874 (citing Pacific, 260 N.W.2d at 554).
228. Id. at 873 (citing Pacific, 260 N.W.2d at 554).
229. Id.
230. Id. (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1683
(1993)).
231. Id. at 874.
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232

was still in the process of installation. The dissent conceded that
the anchor may eventually qualify as an improvement to real
property, making the chronology rather than the nature of the
233
improvement the dissent’s concern.
Additionally, the dissent failed to elaborate on when the
anchor might become an improvement, leaving the reader to
speculate as to how much progress qualifies as intent to fix an
234
Most importantly, the dissent
improvement to real property.
failed to defend against the argument that commencing
installation implies intent to fix the anchor as part of the fiber-optic
system, which brings the structure clearly under applicable
235
definitions; indeed, this is the part of the “permanent” definition
that brings Lietz under the statute’s scope.
The dissent also examined the definitions of “addition” and
236
“betterment.” An “addition,” the dissent explains, is defined as “a
237
A “betterment,”
part added to or joined with a building.”
however, is defined as “a making or becoming better: an
improvement of an estate (as by the addition of new buildings) that
makes it better and more valuable than mere repairing would
238
The dissent justified its rejection of the anchor as an
do.”
improvement to real property based on its supposed failure to
qualify as “permanent” under the applicable definition; it does not
comment on the anchor’s qualification as an “addition” or
239
“betterment.”
The anchor qualified as an addition because it has been joined
240
to the building through the fiber-optic cable system in progress.

232. Id.
233. Id.
234. A taciturn dissent on the issue of permanence may be deliberate. The
enigmatic nature of the permanence question led Halleland and Nelson to
mention that previous cases indicate that “[i]t is by no means dispositive that the
‘improvement’ at issue is not permanently part of the building or property.”
Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 9.
235. See Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 874.
236. Id. at 873.
237. Id. at 873 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 24
(1993)).
238. Id. at 873–74 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
209 (1993)).
239. Id. at 874.
240. See Lederman v. Cragun’s Pine Beach Resort, 247 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2001)
(holding that a temporary trench dug to permit installation of a communications
cable was an “improvement to real property” under Minnesota law and applying
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The anchor also qualified as a betterment because it is an integral
part of the cable system, which undoubtedly enhances the value of
the building to which it is adjoined more than would ordinary
241
repairs. This point, admittedly, depends on the contextual scope
in which one views the anchor; alone it may not qualify as a
betterment, but the fiber-optic system overall would undoubtedly
242
qualify. The dissent addressed neither of these points, missing an
opportunity to bolster its rejection of the anchor as an
improvement or to provide valuable dicta on interpreting the word
“betterment.”
243
Misapplying the “common sense” approach, neglecting to
apply full definitions, and missing opportunities to expand its case,
the dissent concluded that a partially installed anchor cannot be a
permanent addition or betterment to qualify as an improvement to

Minnesota’s two year statute of limitations for construction improvements instead
of the six year statute for negligence actions).
241. In Lederman, the temporary nature of the trench was unimportant; the
fact that the trench was a step necessary to installing the communications cable
was the critical factor. See id. at 815–16. Indeed, the potential value of the
improvement influences whether the steps required to reach that improvement
invoke applicable statutes. See id. In the case of cable systems, courts tend to
require significant stretches to cast a case outside the reach of an improvement to
real property statute. See, e.g., New Meadows Holding Co. by Raugust v. Wash.
Water Power Co., 659 P.2d 1113 (Wash. App. 1983). In New Meadows, the court
held that a residence-destroying fire, allegedly caused by a gas leak resulting from
damage arising from the installation of an underground telephone cable, was not
an improvement to real property. Id. at 1116–17. The court based its ruling on
the fact that the cable system was in no way connected to the residence the fire
destroyed. Id. at 1117. The court also distinguished New Meadows from its ruling
in Washington Natural Gas Co. v. Tyee Construction Co., 611 P.2d 1378 (Wash. 1980),
in which the lines related to the injury directly added value to the property
involved.
242. See Jennings, supra note 4, at 475; Mullaly & Bloomquist, supra note 128, at
17–18 (revealing interpretive inconsistencies that could affect the “betterment”
issue). For example, Minnesota courts have found walls to be an improvement
while holding that the blocks composing the wall were not improvements; one
could argue that this shows that an element of an overall improvement does not
qualify as a betterment. See Jennings, supra note 4, at 476. At the same time, other
elements of improvements, such as ceiling mortar (as opposed to the entire
ceiling) have also been held to qualify as improvements under the Minnesota
statute. Mullaly & Bloomquist, supra note 128, at 17–18. These varied results
demonstrate the extent to which the anchor’s classification as a “betterment” may
be no less debatable than its classification as “permanent.”
243. Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 874 (stating that defining the anchor as permanent
defies common sense instead of applying the “commonsense” approach by
interpreting words according to their common usage).
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244

real property. This convenient prevarication preserved liability by
betraying the strict construction approach it purportedly employs.
C. Keeping It Simple: An Alternate Path to the Lietz Holding
Section 541.051 is a statute in need of a consistent interpretive
245
Lietz offers a clear holding, alerting litigants that
methodology.
incomplete improvements are within the statute’s reach; however,
its misguided legislative intent analysis only further muddies the
waters of section 541.051 by offering another convoluted
explanation where clarity is both available and preferable.
A well-executed plain meaning interpretation provides the
same holding while also establishing the appropriate mode of
statutory construction. Because the meaning of “improvement to
real property” is clear, there is no need to divine (or invent)
corresponding legislative intent.
An “improvement to real
246
property” is a permanent addition or betterment. A “permanent”
addition is a component that is fixed or intended to be fixed; the
247
anchor, already nearly installed, was fixed or, at least, intended to
be fixed as an integral part of the fiber-optics infrastructure. The
anchor also likely qualifies as a “betterment,” since a
telecommunications system would improve the property’s value
248
It could likely be considered an
more than ordinary repairs.
“addition” as well since the cable was joined to the building
249
through the cable system.
Under this analysis, the court need only look to the statute,
Pacific’s long-established definition, and the plain meaning of the
words therein to find answers. Incomplete improvements should
qualify under section 541.051 not because that is what the
legislature intended, but because that is what basic statutory
construction commands.
244. Id.
245. See Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 8 (noting that inconsistent
interpretive methodology has led Minnesota courts to apply section 541.051 in
ways that surprise litigants).
246. Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 869 (quoting Pac. Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger,
Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 554 (Minn. 1977)).
247. Id. at 868 (emphasizing that the anchor was nearly installed when the
crew pierced the gas line).
248. See id. at 874 (Page, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the value component of a
“betterment”).
249. See Lederman v. Cragun’s Pine Beach Resort, 247 F.3d 812, 815–16 (8th
Cir. 2001).
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V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, Lietz reached the right destination, albeit by a
rocky, wayward course. The plain meaning of both the statute and
related case law support Lietz’s holding; thus, a linguistic proof, not
a fumbling grasp for legislative intent, was all that was required.
Still, despite its wooly reasoning, Lietz represents an important next
step in understanding this often murky area in Minnesota law.
Following Lietz, the timeline of section 541.051 is clear:
improvements most likely begin at conception, not completion.
The court’s resort to legislative intent analysis may reveal its
approach to the statute; one that offers the greatest flexibility in
controlling liability. The court, however, should have preserved
this interpretive methodology for a more urgent occasion. While
the analysis did not harm Lietz’s holding, it detracted from it. After
all, there may be more than one way to skin a cat, but some ways
are better than others.
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